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HARMFUL SPEECH AND TRUE THREATS:
VIRGINIA V. BLACK AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
NINA PETRARO*
INTRODUCTION
'Free speech' is a phrase often utilized in many political,
academic, business and social forums, and carries with it
tremendous patriotic meaning. Even the average American,
however, knows that its parameters are not unlimited. What is
and should be included under the First Amendment's realm of
protection? How should various non-verbal conduct and symbolic
communication be treated under this analysis? And does a
symbol's meaning transform over time as its significance
changes? Should threatening speech be limited? And what about
terrorist threats? All of these questions raise issues regarding
First Amendment jurisprudence. On the one hand, various
supporters argue that such threats should be afforded the
broadest Constitutional protection possible, comparing these acts
to everyday speech falling within the parameters of the First
Amendment's Free Speech Clause.1 On the other hand, many
* J.D. Candidate, St. John's University School of Law, June 2006; B.A., Government &
Politics, summa cum laude, St. John's University, May 2003. The author would like to
extend her gratitude to Professor Philip Weinberg for his guidance and Dr. William Gangi
for his inspiration in developing this Note, as well as to the staff of St. John's Journal of
Legal Commentary for their assistance and dedication. The author would also like to
thank her family and friends for supporting her in this endeavor, and especially Chris for
always standing by her.
1 See W. Wat Hopkins, Cross Burning Revisited: What the Supreme Court Should
Have Done in Virginia v. Black and Why It Didn't, 26 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 269,
308-09 (2004) (drawing distinction between intimidating speech and "true threats,"
arguing that the prior should be protected by the First Amendment while the latter
should not); Matthew G. T. Martin, True Threats, Militant Activists, and the First
Amendment, 82 N.C.L. REV. 280, 308-10 (2003) (describing Professor C. Edwin Baker's
view that threatening speech should be protected under the First Amendment, unless it
involves direct violence or coercion to another); Jennifer E. Rothman, Article, Freedom of
Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 283, 289 (2001) (proposing
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argue that the danger of threatening speech outweighs its
minimal social or discursive value, thereby justifying its
limitation.2 This Note will argue that the First Amendment's
right to free speech should be safely limited through the 'True
Threats Doctrine,' so that the State can regulate speech and
behavior which intimidates or causes fear of the directed
listener's life or physical well-being. Specifically, the Note will
follow the analysis of Virginia v. Black,3 a Supreme Court case
which held that cross-burning with an intent to intimidate was a
type of true threat, and consequently proscribable conduct under
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.4 Finally, this
analysis will then be applied to the so-called speech rights of
terrorist groups, while utilizing the jurisprudence and political
theories behind symbolic speech, as well as recent federal and
state cases adjudicating this issue, to argue that certain types of
terrorizing and intimidating speech and conduct do not fall under
the protection of the United States Constitution.
I. VIRGINIA V. BLACK: THE CASE USED AS A LENS FOR THESE
ISSUES
The recent Supreme Court case Virginia v. Black5 addressed
the broad issue of whether the symbolic conduct of burning a
cross was protected by the First Amendment. 6 The Court, in
doing so, evaluated the effects of threats, intimidation and
terrorizing activity on First Amendment freedoms and analyzed
threatening speech should be restricted only if proved that offender had subjective intent
to frighten or coerce target and that offender suggested threat would be carried out).
2 See Jennifer Elrod, Expressive Activity, True Threats, and the First Amendment, 36
CONN. L. REV. 541, 608 (2004) (stating that proscription against threats is based on sound
policy that threats have little or no value because they "do not foster debate, they do not
encourage diversity of views, they do not enhance political participation, they do not
prompt discussion on issues of public concern, and they do not permit the expression of
opinion"); Steven G. Gey, A Few Questions About Cross Burning, Intimidation, and Free
Speech, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1325 (2005) (explaining Court's justification for
excluding "true threats" from constitutional protection lies in the threats' slight social
value measured against the desire for societal "order and morality").
3 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
4 Black, 538 U.S. at 363 (defining cross burning as "virulent form of intimidation and
unprotected by First Amendment").
5 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
6 Id. at 347 (framing constitutional issue of case); see Amanda J Congdon, Note,
Burned Out: The Supreme Court Strikes Down Virginia's Cross Burning Statute in
Virginia v. Black, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1049, 1082 (2004) (explaining challenge Supreme
Court faced regarding constitutionality of statutory prohibition against cross burning).
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the historical hatred and meaning behind such symbols.7
Consequently, Black establishes the jurisprudence that limits
intimidating types of speech and symbolic expression, and as this
Note will argue, the threats and frightening speech of all
terrorist organizations and individuals.
Virginia v. Black8 involved two distinct factual stories.9 In the
first, Richard Elliott and Jonathan O'Mara, burned a cross on the
front yard of African-American James Jubilee, allegedly in
response to Jubilee's complaint regarding Elliot shooting a gun in
his backyard.10 In the second, just four months later, Barry Elton
Black, the Imperial Wizard of the Keystone Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan, led a rally held by permission on private property.'i
All parties were thereafter arrested and convicted under
Virginia's cross-burning statute. 12  Elliott and O'Mara's
convictions, unlike Black's, were upheld in each state and federal
court due to a proper jury instruction,i 3 and analysis of their
claims ends here for purposes of this Note.
The procedural posture of Barry Elton Black's conviction and
case is not as complicated as the constitutional issues behind it.J4
At trial, Black was convicted under the Virginia state cross-
burning statute which stated, "It shall be unlawful for any
person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any person or
group of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the
property of another, a highway or other public place."i5 In terms
of evidentiary purposes, the law explained, "Any such burning of
7 Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60 (discussing case law regarding "true threats" and
intimidation, and applying such concepts to cross-burning).
8 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
9 Black, 538 U.S. at 348-51 (laying out facts regarding respondents Barry Black,
Richard Elliott and Jonathan O'Mara); see Congdon, supra note 6, at 1082-83 (telling
stories of Barry Black, Richard Elliott, and Jonathan O'Mara).
10 Black, 538 U.S. at 350 (noting facts of case); see Congdon, supra note 6, at 1083
(describing facts of Elliott's and O'Mara's cross burning activities); Mark S. Enslin, Case
Note, Domestic Terrorism or Protected Free Speech: The Supreme Court Decides the Cross-
Burning Question in Black v. Virginia, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 178, 182 (2002) (detailing
facts of Elliott's and O'Mara's actions).
11 Black, 538 U.S. at 348 (giving facts of Black's Klan rally); see Congdon, supra note
6, at 1082 (discussing Black's Klan rally); Enslin, supra note 10, at 183 (discussing facts of
Black's Klan rally).
12 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (1996).
13 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 364 (2003).
14 See Congdon, supra note 6, at 1083-85 (discussing in detail state court decisions
and rationale); Enslin, supra note 10, at 184-87 (citing Virginia state courts ruling on
Black's conviction).
15 Black, 538 U.S. at 348 (quoting Va.. Code Ann. § 18.2-423).
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a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a
person or group of persons."1 6 The trial court instructed the jury
on the meaning of "intent to intimidate" and that the burning of
the cross itself is sufficient to infer the requisite intent. 17 Black
objected to this last instruction on First Amendment grounds and
appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals of Virginia,
arguing that the cross-burning statute should be declared
unconstitutional.18 Nonetheless, the Virginia Court of Appeals
affirmed Black's conviction and he therefore appealed to the
Supreme Court of Virginia.19 There the highest court in the State
held the act facially unconstitutional, citing to its impermissibly
discriminatory content-based nature, and its overbroad prima
facie evidence provision. 20 Three justices dissented however, and
argued that the Virginia cross-burning statute only applied to
conduct that constituted a "true threat" and was therefore
constitutional.21 The dissenters also disagreed with the majority
opinion with regard to the prima facie provision, noting that
Virginia still had the burden of proof to prove intent to
intimidate.22 Subsequently thereafter the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 23
The Supreme Court in Virginia v. Black24 there affirmed the
reversal of Black's conviction, vacated in part and remanded back
16 Id. (quoting Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-423).
17 Black, 538 U.S. at 349 (restating trial court's jury instructions); see Chris L.
Brannon, First Amendment Permits Ban on Cross Burning When Done with the Intent to
Intimidate, 73 MiSS. L.J. 323, 324 (2003) (reviewing procedural posture of case); Congdon,
supra note 6, at 1083 (discussing jury instruction given in trial court).
18 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 349-50 (2003) (discussing Black's objections to trial
court's holding and his appeal to Court of Appeals of Virginia); see Brannon, supra note
17, at 324 n.6. (recounting Black's objection to trial court's jury instructions concerning
inference of intent on First Amendment grounds).
19 Black, 538 U.S. at 350-51 (citing procedural posture); see Brannon, supra note 17,
at 324-25 (discussing Black's appeal).
20 Black, 538 U.S. at 351 (explaining Supreme Court of Virginia's decision); see
Brannon, supra note 17, at 325 (discussing Court's holding).
21 Black, 538 U.S. at 351-52 (quoting Virginia justices' reasons for dissent); see
Enslin, supra note 10, at 187-89 (explaining Justice Hassell's interpretation of Virginia
statute); see also discussion infra Part III (discussing 'true threats' doctrine).
22 Black, 538 U.S. at 352 (discussing dissent's arguments in Virginia Supreme court
decision); see Congdon, supra note 6, at 1085 (noting dissent's position that statutorily-
created inference alone was insufficient to establish intent to intimidate beyond a
reasonable doubt).
23 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 352 (2003) (granting certiorari); see Brannon, supra
note 17, at 325 (following procedural posture of case).
24 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
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to state court.25 Black held that although a state's ban on cross
burning with the intent to intimidate was, in fact, constitutional
under the First Amendment, 26 the prima facie provision given by
the jury instruction made the Virginia statute facially
unconstitutional. 27 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the
plurality, explained that such a provision compelled the jury to
convict in every cross-burning case, because they would
automatically find the intent to intimidate regardless of the
individual facts of the case. 28 Justice John Paul Stevens
concurred in Black simply because he believed the Virginia cross-
burning statute was overbroad and therefore unconstitutional
under the First Amendment. 29
Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas dissented separately,
arguing that cross burning should never be constitutionally
protected conduct.30 He reminded the Court that the Ku Klux
Klan is the oldest and most persistent terrorist organization in
the world, known to harass, murder and torture, and use the
burning cross as a way to terrorize, frighten and intimidate.31
25 Black, 538 U.S. at 367 (discussing holding of United States Supreme Court); see
Brannon, supra note 17, at 325 (summarizing Black's holding).
26 Black, 538 U.S. at 363. The Court stated that "burning a cross is a particularly
virulent form of intimidation." Id. It instructed Virginia that instead of prohibiting all
intimidating messages, it may choose to regulate cross burning in light of its 'long and
pernicious history as a signal of impending violence." Id. Thus, "just as a State may
regulate only that obscenity which is the most obscene due to its prurient content," the
Court explained, "so to may a State choose to prohibit only those forms of intimidation
that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm." Id. For an explanation of this holding
see Melanie Bradford, State Statutes May Prohibit Cross Burning Performed with the
Intent to Intimidate Without Violating the First Amendment, 34 CUMB. L. REV 607, 609
(2003).
27 Black, 538 U.S. at 367 (noting prima facie provision given by jury instruction); see
Bradford, supra note 26, at 609 (justifying Court's decision rendering statute
unconstitutional due to clause which allowed act of cross burning to be considered in
prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate). But see Congdon, supra note 6, at 1103
(condemning Supreme Court in incorrectly holding that prima facie provision rendered
entire statute unconstitutional).
28 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (announcing rationale for holding
regarding prima facie evidence provision); see Bradford, supra note 26, at 609 (detailing
Court's holding that prima facie provision of Virginian cross-burning statute allowed jury
to convict based on act committed, not upon defendant's intent or lack of intent).
29 Black, 538 U.S. at 368 (discussing Justice Stevens' concurring opinion); see
Brannon, supra note 17, at 339 (summarizing Justice Stevens' concurrence).
30 Black, 538 U.S. at 388 (noting Justice Thomas' dissent); see Brannon, supra note
17, at 342 (explaining Justice Thomas' reasons for disagreeing with majority's
conclusions).
31 Black, 538 U.S. at 388-89 (noting Klan's long and violent history); see Brannon,
supra note 17, at 342 (discussing Justice Thomas' dissent as reviewing Klan's vile
history); Maribeth G. Berlin, Article, The Shortcomings of the Supreme Court's Viewpoint
536 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:2
Justice Thomas continued by citing to culture and history which
establishes the solitary meaning of a burning cross - instilling in
its victims a well-grounded fear of physical violence. 32 Finally,
Justice Thomas concluded that this conduct, using hate,
terrorism and intimidation to express an idea, falls outside the
realm of First Amendment analysis.33
Justice Antonin Scalia finally concurred in part and dissented
in part to the plurality opinion in Virginia v. Black.34 He
concurred with the Majority that a state can constitutionally
prohibit cross burning with an intent to intimidate, 35 but
dissented because of the lack of justification to invalidate the
provision on its face due to the prima facie provision.36
The case law and jurisprudence leading up to and relied upon
by the Court establish the limits and parameters of the First
Amendment which allow for the Virginia v. Black rationale to
hold cross-burning with the intent to intimidate as proscribable
constitutional conduct. 37 The Court first explains that protections
to freedom of speech are not absolute; the government is able to
constitutionally regulate certain categories of communicative
Discrimination Analysis in Virginia v. Black, 81 DENV. U.L. REV 143, 160 (2003)
(explaining Justice Thomas' statement that cross burning is form of intimidation).
32 Black, 538 U.S. at 391 (discussing Justice Thomas' dissent); see Brannon, supra
note 17, at 342 (noting Justice Thomas' assertions regarding cross burning and its
meaning to victims); see also Berlin, supra note 31, at 160 (discussing historical meaning
of cross burning in United States to certain target groups).
33 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 394-95 (2003) (discussing Justice Thomas'
dissent); see Brannon, supra note 17, at 342-43 (explaining view that statute prohibited
only conduct and therefore raised no First Amendment issues); see also Berlin, supra note
31, at 160 (observing Justice Thomas' argument that cross burning should have been
classified as conduct, and not expression governed by First Amendment).
34 538 U.S. 343, 368 (2003).
35 Black, 538 U.S. at 368 (stating Court's majority holding); see Brannon, supra note
17, at 339 (explaining Justice Scalia's concurrence with majority); see also Berlin, supra
note 31, at 158 (discussing Justice Scalia's agreement with plurality insofar as a state
may regulate cross-burning without infringing on First Amendment).
36 Black, 538 U.S. at 368 (rejecting Supreme Court's majority opinion with regard to
prima facie provision of statute); see Brannon, supra note 17, at 339-40 (discussing
Justice Scalia's argument that in Virginia, prima facie evidence is sufficient only if it goes
unrebutted and noting Justice Scalia's rejection of plurality's conclusion that statute was
overbroad); see also Berlin, supra note 31, at 158-59 (noting Justice Scalia's dissent in
part, where he explained that prima facie evidence provision was mere inference and did
not give prosecution so large an advantage so as to render statute substantially
overbroad).
37 Black, 538 U.S. at 368 (noting justification for Supreme Court's holding); see also
Brannon, supra note 17, at 336-37 (commenting on holding of R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377 (1992), and noting that because Virginia statute falls within exception to general rule
set by R.A. V, it is constitutional).
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expression. 38 Those areas in which the First Amendment allows
restrictions are "of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that might be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."39 One
such area is speech inciting an immediate breach of the peace,
which states are therefore permitted to limit and punish.40 This
kind of constitutionally proscribable speech is referred to as
"fighting words," which are "personal abusive epithets," generally
known to likely provoke violent reaction when addressed to the
ordinary person.4 1 The First Amendment also permits a state
ban on threats of violence, 42 as well as intimidation.43 Therefore,
the Court held that Virginia's statute did not violate the First
Amendment by banning a threat of violence and form of
intimidation - cross burning with the intent to intimidate. 44
38 Black, 538 U.S. at 358 (stating government's powers to regulate speech despite
First Amendment); see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)
(stating that "[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem"); see also Bradford, supra note 26, at 609-10 (examining Chaplinsky and how it
established narrow exceptions to First Amendment's protection).
39 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358-59 (2003) (commenting on narrow restrictions
on First Amendment) (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382-83 (1992)); see Chaplinsky, 315
U.S. at 572 (declaring that "[ilt has been well observed that such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that might be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality"); see also Bradford, supra note 26, at 610 (explaining
Chaplinsky holding that words having direct tendency to cause acts of violence fall
outside protection of First Amendment).
40 Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (summarizing case law from First Amendment
jurisprudence); see Bradford, supra note 26, at 610 (breaking down 'fighting words'
exception as being determined by what a reasonable person would consider to be likely to
incite violence by addressee).
41 Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)); see
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (defining fighting words and the injury derived from the
utterance of such words).
42 Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (defining "true threats" as "those statements where the
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit and act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals") (citing Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)); see Brannon, supra note 17, at 328 (noting Watts
distinction between "true threats" which could be prohibited and constitutionally
protected speech).
43 Black, 538 U.S. at 360 (defining "intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable
sense of the word [as] a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or
group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death"); see
Brannon, supra note 17, at 336 (citing Court's determination to prohibit intimidation as
type of "true threat").
44 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 362 (2003) (finding part of Virginia statute
constitutional due to "true threats" and intimidation exception to First Amendment); see
Bradford, supra note 26, at 616 (explaining Black's decision that conduct in a threatening
manner falls outside protective scope of First Amendment and is therefore proscribable).
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R.A.V. v. St. Paul,45 as Black's direct predecessor, took a quite
different approach to the cross-burning statute issue. 46 In R.A. V.,
a group of teenagers assembled a cross using broken chair legs
and burned it inside an African-American family's fenced yard.47
They were thereafter convicted under the city of St. Paul's Bias-
Motivated Crime Ordinance,48 which criminalized burning a
cross on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.49 The
juvenile petitioner, given the name "R.A.V." for anonymity
purposes, moved to dismiss the conviction, claiming the
ordinance violated the First Amendment due to its impermissibly
overbroad nature.50 The trial court granted this motion, but the
Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the St. Paul
ordinance reached only expression which is not protected by the
First Amendment.5 1 Finally, the United States Supreme Court
reversed, ruling that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its
face because it prohibited otherwise permitted speech on the
basis of the subject which the speech addressed. 52 The Court held
that such a law was unconstitutional because it discriminated
based on the speech's content, targeting only people who
45 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
46 Compare Black, 538 U.S. at 367 (holding statute prohibiting cross burning with the
intent to intimidate constitutional), with R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 396 (holding statute
prohibiting cross burning unconstitutional).
47 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 379 (stating facts of case); see Chris Demaske, Modern Power
and the First Amendment: Reassessing Hate Speech, 9 CoMM. L. & POLy 273, 297 (2004)
(narrating teenagers' actions); Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Constitutional
Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1539 (2003) (recalling
facts of case).
48 ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990) (stating that "[w]hoever places on
public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti,
including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor"); see Brannon, supra note 17, at 333 (describing ordinance).
49 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380 (discussing what activities were criminalized under
statute); see Demaske, supra note 47, at 297 (summarizing St. Paul's Bias-Motivated
Crime Ordinance); Rosenfeld, supra note 47, at 1539 (citing to criminal ordinance).
50 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992) (explaining motions made by
petitioner); see Demaske, supra note 47, at 297 (reviewing R.A..'s claim); Berlin, supra
note 31, at 150 (summarizing defendant's constitutional claim).
51 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381 (stating ordinance "reached only expression that the first
amendment does not protect" (internal quotations and citations omitted)); see Berlin,
supra note 31, at 150-51 (reviewing state court's decision and rationale); see also
Demaske, supra note 47, at 297 (following procedural posture of case).
52 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381 (concluding ordinance unconstitutional); see Demaske,
supra note 47, at 298 (noting Supreme Court overturned state court's ruling); Rosenfeld,
supra note 47, at 1539 (summarizing Court's unanimous decision invalidating act which
criminalized some incitement but not others).
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provoked violence on one of the reasons listed in the law, while
not criminalizing individuals using "fighting words" on other
bases, such as political affiliation, union membership or
homosexuality. 53 Such a content-based discrimination allowed
the city "to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who
express views on disfavored subjects," and was therefore held
unconstitutional in R.A. V54
Only four Supreme Court Justices, however, concurred in the
judgment, agreeing with the result of reversal and proclamation
of the ordinance as unconstitutional, but strongly disagreeing
with the plurality's rationale. 55 They believed the case should
have been decided on a ground raised by the parties, rather than
what they viewed as the plurality's departure from First
Amendment jurisprudence in creating their own grounds for
invalidating the St. Paul Ordinance. 56 The concurrence in R.A. V.
argued that the challenged cross-burning statute was overbroad,
criminalizing not only protected expression, but also expression
constitutionally protected by the First Amendment. 57 The four
justices thus characterized the St. Paul ordinance as an
overbroad law which prohibited expressive conduct that is
53 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 361 (2003); see Rosenfeld, supra note 47, at 1539
(rationalizing Court's explanation that ordinance did not criminalize similar expression
equally likely to incite violence on other bases); see also Berlin, supra note 31, at 151
(discussing Court's observation that ordinance did not prohibit bias-motivated messages
directed at other groups, such as homosexuals).
54 Black, 538 U.S. at 361 (2003) (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391); see Demaske, supra
note 47, at 298 (discussing Court's finding that ordinance was impermissibly content-
based because it only restricted subset of fighting words based solely on content);
Rosenfeld, supra note 47, at 1539 (classifying ordinance as impermissible viewpoint
discrimination).
55 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 397 (1992) (acknowledging that Justice
White, Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor agreed "with the majority
that the judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court should be reversed," but noting that
"[the] agreement ends there"); see Demaske, supra note 47, at 303 (describing Justice
White's disagreement with majority's application of "content neutrality to proscribable
categories of speech" in R.A. V.).
56 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 397-98 (1992) (White, J., concurring) (arguing plurality "holds
the ordinance facially unconstitutional on a ground that was never presented to the
Minnesota Supreme Court, a ground that has not been briefed by the parties before this
Court, a ground that requires serious departures from the teaching of prior cases..."); see
Demaske, supra note 47, at 305 (describing Justice White's frustration with majority's
reasoning).
57 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 397 (White, J., concurring) (explaining why St. Paul's ordinance
was facially overbroad); see Demaske, supra note 47, at 305 (pointing out majority's
rejection of traditional First Amendment "overbreadth" doctrine while instituting new
First Amendment "underbreadth" doctrine).
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protected by the First Amendment and is therefore
constitutionally invalid on its face.58
Federal and state cross-burning statutes after R.A.V. v. St.
Paul5 9 faced varying constitutional results in court. 60 On the one
hand, the Maryland Court of Appeals, South Carolina Supreme
Court, and New Jersey Supreme Court found their respective
states' cross-burning statutes unconstitutional. 61 On the other
hand, Florida's Supreme Court and -the. California Court of
Appeals upheld cross-burning statutes as being "proscribable
conduct" under the First Amendment. 62 Moreover, each federal
appellate court deciding the issue post-R.A.V upheld cross-
burning statutes as constitutional.63 These state supreme and
federal appellate court decisions paved the way for Black's
58 R.A.V., U.S. at 414 (explaining that Constitution does not protect expressive
conduct that only causes hurt feelings, offense or resentment and that any law banning
such conduct in addition to unprotected speech, according to "underbreadth doctrine,"
must be invalidated on its face); see Demaske, supra note 47, at 305 (recounting Justice
White's conclusion that new Court approach to First Amendment doctrine embraced by
majority left legislatures with "little room to prosecute certain harms").
59 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
60 See Hopkins, supra note 1, at 284 (observing that United States government and
many states continued to punish cross burning despite R.A.V ruling and reviewed each
state and federal court case on matter); Enslin, supra note 10, at 193 (noting that state
courts have been split on whether cross-burning statutes are constitutional).
61 Hopkins, supra note 1, at 288-93 (discussing State v. Sheldon, 629 A.2d 753 (Md.
1993), State v. Ramsey, 430 S.E.2d 511 (S.C. 1993), and State v. Vawter, 642 A.2d 349
(N.J. 1994), each of which found cross burning to be a form of protected speech); Enslin,
supra note 10, at 194-95 (reviewing Maryland and South Carolina's decisions to uphold
their respective state's cross-burning statutes).
62 Hopkins, supra note 1, at 290-91 (discussing State v. T.B.D., 656 So.2d 479 (Fla.
1995) and People v. Steven S., 31 Cal. Rptr.2d 644 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), which found
messages conveyed by cross-burning to be threats and beyond First Amendment
protection, and explaining T.B.D. court's likening of "unauthorized cross-burning by
intruders in one's own yard" to "lynchings, shootings, whippings, mutilations, and home-
burnings"); see Enslin, supra note 10, at 195-97 (reiterating states' finding that their
cross-burning statutes did not violate free speech clause of First Amendment because
such conduct constituted true threats of violence, fear and intimidation and therefore was
legitimate governmental regulation).
63 See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 65 F.3d 918 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding
defendants can be convicted for cross burning on grounds that it is a conspiracy to violate
a person's civil rights and because it is a threat to a person's right to remain in their
domicile regardless of their race); United States v. McDermott, 29 F.3d 404 (8th Cir. 1994)
(ruling threats of violence are not privy to First Amendment protection); United States v.
J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 1994) (agreeing that cross-burning statues are designed to
punish any threat or intimidation, or a conspiracy to threaten or to intimidate and that
they are not directed at limiting protected speech); United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241
(7th Cir. 1993); see also Hopkins, supra note 1, at 285 (noting that federal government has
been more successful in prosecuting defendants who burned crosses).
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decision regarding the right of a government to ban cross-
burning.64
Although the Black Court did not overrule or even criticize
R.A.V. v. St. Paul's holding, it did not follow its content-neutral
categorical approach rationale regarding state cross-burning
statutes.65 Black differentiated the Virginia statute from St.
Paul's ordinance, characterizing it as a permissible, content-
neutral regulation of a proscribable category of speech.66 It also
further distinguished and clarified R.A.V.'s holding, thereby
limiting the importance of R.A.V's content-neutral approach. 67
Virginia v. Black additionally argued that R.A. V did not prohibit
all forms of content-based speech discrimination and that it was
constitutional to ban only a particular type of threat.68 Their
64 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003) (noting bans on cross burning are
consistent with First Amendment); see Angela R. Ernst, Virginia v. Black, 10 WASH. &
LEE R.E.A.L. J. 131, 139 (2004) (arguing Black clarifies relevant case law).
65 Black, 538 U.S. at 361-62; R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386-87 (1992)
(finding that categorical approach has become engrained in First Amendment
jurisprudence). But see Hopkins, supra note 1, at 281-82 (criticizing R.A. V. decision).
66 Black, 538 U.S. at 362 (distinguishing the two statutes by stating, "[u]nlike the
statute at issue in R.A.V., the Virginia statute does not single out for opprobrium only
that speech directed toward one of the specific disfavored topics" (internal quotations and
citations omitted)); see Berlin, supra note 31, at 156 (rationalizing that Virginia statute
prohibited all cross burnings done with intent to intimidate and did not allow state to
selectively regulate cross burnings only when speech expressed disfavored views, as St.
Paul ordinance did); see also Enslin, supra note 10, at 201 (distinguishing two statutes
from these two cases).
67 Black, 538 U.S. at 361-62 (noting statute in R.A.V. was unconstitutional because it
used content based discrimination in targeting only persons who "provoke[d] violence on a
basis specified in the law" and not covering those who used fighting words "in connection
with other ideas - to express hostility, for example, on the basis of political affiliation,
union membership, or homosexuality" (internal quotations and citations omitted)); R.A. V,
505 U.S. at 387 (1992) (noting "[t]here is no problem whatever, for example, with a State's
prohibiting obscenity (and other forms of proscribable expression) only in certain media or
markets, for although that prohibition would be 'underinclusive,' it would not
discriminate on the basis of content"); see Demaske, supra note 47, at 298-99 (pointing
out that R.A.V. Court focused less on fighting words doctrine and more on applying
principle of content neutrality to First Amendment analysis and arguing that the case
weakened the categorical approach in First Amendment jurisprudence and caused
questioning of the strength of this content neutrality principle); see also Jonathan M.
Holdowsky, Out of the Ashes of the Cross: The Legacy of R.A.V, v. St. Paul, 30 NEW
ENGLAND L. REV. 1115, 1115 (1996) (emphasizing that "[flew cases in recent years have
confused the landscape of First Amendment jurisprudence more than R.A. V. v. St. Paul').
68 Black, 538 U.S. at 361-62 (clarifying that R.A.V. did not hold that First
Amendment prohibits all forms of content-based discrimination but, rather, that some
types of content discrimination do not violate the first amendment); see R.A. V. 505 U.S. at
388 (clarifying that it is constitutional to discriminate based on content within a
particular class of speech which is proscribable, for example, prohibiting only the most
prurient obscene speech); see also Berlin, supra note 31, at 157 (noting that Black focused
on R.A.V. exceptions, rather than general rule that content-based regulations within
categories of proscribable speech are prohibited).
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reasoning was because a State could regulate certain types of
very obscene speech - in other words a subset of permissibly
proscribable speech - it could prohibit forms of intimidating
speech which incited fear of bodily harm - a subset of
intimidation, an area of proscribable speech. 69 Consequently, a
ban on those cross burnings with an intent to intimidate is
constitutional under the First Amendment and this holding was
still consistent with R.A. V. v. St. Paul.70
II. JURISPRUDENCE OF FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF SPEECH
AND EXPRESSION
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution reads,
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances." 71 The Free Speech Clause has been
interpreted differently from its textual meaning. Congress
certainly has passed many laws abridging, or limiting an
individual's right to free speech, and such laws have passed
muster if within certain proscribable exception categories created
by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the right to free speech has
progressed from the original interpretation of mere verbal and
written words, extending to expressive and symbolic conduct. 72
In his famous dissent to Abrams v. United States,73 Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes established the later-followed rule that
advocacy ought to be protected by the First Amendment and that
free speech includes a free exchange of ideas, especially those we
69 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003) (finding states may choose to prohibit
speech which intimidates); see Cohen v California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (stating that
States may ban the use of "fighting words").
70 Black, 538 U.S. at 363 (stating that "[tihe First Amendment permits Virginia to
outlaw cross burnings done with the intent to intimidate because burning a cross is a
particularly virulent form of intimidation"); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387
(1992) (noting First Amendment protection "applies differently in the context of
proscribable speech than in the area of fully protected speech").
71 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
72 Black, 538 U.S. 343 (discussing constitutionality of state ban on cross-burning);
R.A.V. 505 U.S. at 382-383 (discussing constitutionality of cross-burning); Chaplinsky v
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (stating words which tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace are not proper forms of communication and are not
constitutionally protected).
73 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
2006] FIRSTAMENDMENTINANAGE OF TERRORISM 543
despise. 74 Even while making quite a grand proclamation for his
time, Holmes nevertheless acknowledged that such a right must
be limited in certain circumstances. 75 Stromberg v. California76
next clarified that the First Amendment grants Americans the
right to engage in unfettered political discourse, but is not
absolute, giving no one the authority to incite violence and
crime.77 The more historically recent case Brandenburg v. Ohio78
distinguishes Holmes' advocacy from incitement, protecting the
former as free speech under the First Amendment, and outlawing
the latter as beyond the guarantees of this constitutional right.79
Verbal messages are not the only type of 'speech' that the First
Amendment protects; freedom of expression and symbolic speech
also fall within the parameters of this right.80 Stromberg v.
74 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (noting that "[w]e should be eternally vigilant against
attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe"); see Elise Gabrielle Sweeney,
Freedom of Speech: Protections and Limitations, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 77, 78 (2004)
(noting that Justice Holmes' famous dissent supports fundamental rights of individuals to
engage in free exchange of ideas in marketplace, even if disputed speech is unpopular); see
also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (stressing the importance
of open, uninhibited and robust discussion and criticism of political and governmental
leaders, no matter how caustic, vehement and unpleasant such attacks might be).
75 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (arguing that free speech must be protected unless it "so
imminently threaten[s] immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of
the law that an immediate check is required to save the country"); see Tom Hentoff,
Speech, Harm, and Self-Government: Understanding the Ambit of the Clear and Present
Danger Test, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1467 (1991) (noting the clear and present danger
test protects only certain types of speech).
76 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
77 Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 368-69 (ruling First Amendment right is not absolute and
allows for State to punish those who incite violence and crime, and engage in
lawlessness); see Sweeney, supra note 74, at 88 (observing that Supreme Court has
declined to extend First Amendment protections to speech that incites violence or other
lawless action, and rationalizing that speech inciting violence has higher propensity than
other forms of speech to produce lawless action and is therefore afforded few protections).
78 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
79 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (noting past Supreme Court decisions "have
fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action"); see Elrod, supra note 2, at 565 (noting that
"[a]s formulated in Brandenburg v. Ohio, incitement requires a nexus of three factors: 1)
speaker must advocate the use of force or violation of the law, 2) his expression must be
directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless acts, and 3) his speech must be likely
to produce such actions with some immediacy"); see also Bradford, supra note 26, at 611
(further discussing Brandenburg's incitement test).
80 See Timothy Zick, Cross Burning, Cockfighting, and Symbolic Meaning: Toward a
First Amendment Ethnography, 45 WM AND MARY L. REV. 2261, 2273-74 (2004)
(discussing jurisprudence of freedom of expression and symbolic speech in past six
decades); see also Ethan Fishman, Loper, Begging and Civic Virtue, 46 ALA. L. REV. 783,
792 (1995) (speaking of fairly recent recognition of symbolic speech in courts).
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California81 first held the symbolic gesture of displaying a flag as
opposition to organized government was protected as
fundamental political discussion protected by the Free Speech
Clause.S2 Moreover, the seminal case of Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District83  reaffirmed the
extension of the First Amendment right beyond pure speech to
political expression.8 4 Here, students were suspended for wearing
black arm bands in protest of the Vietnam War,85 but the
Supreme Court held such conduct as protected under the First
Amendment because it expressed political views and was "closely
akin" to pure speech.86 Cases decided thereafter have reaffirmed
the principle that the safeguards afforded by the freedom of
speech include expression, and not merely verbal and written
words.8 7  The Supreme Court additionally extended this
sanctified First Amendment right to conduct with elements of
communication, such as the burning of the American flag.88 The
81 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
82 Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 369 (finding that "[t]he maintenance of the opportunity for
free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the
security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system" and
holding that "[a] statute which upon its face, and as authoritatively construed, is so vague
and indefinite as to permit the punishment of the fair use of this opportunity is repugnant
to the guaranty of liberty ... the first clause of the statute being invalid upon its face, the
conviction of the appellant.., must be set aside"); see Zick, supra note 80, at 2280
(discussing symbolism of American flag).
83 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
84 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (holding First Amendment includes freedom of expression
and emphasizing that "[flreedom of expression would not truly exist if the right could be
exercised only in an area that a benevolent government has provided as a safe haven for
crackpots"); see Zick, supra note 80, at 2277 (observing Court's ruling that certain acts of
expression are included within protection of Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment).
85 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504 (discussing students' statement and school's reaction); see
Zick, supra note 80, at 2277 (reviewing facts of students refusing to remove armbands in
violation of school policy and therefore receiving punishment of suspension).
86 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (discussing why First Amendment protects more than pure
speech and explaining that "we do not confine the permissible exercise of First
Amendment rights to a telephone booth or the four corners of a pamphlet, or to supervised
and ordained discussion in a school classroom"); see Zick, supra note 80, at 2277
(explaining Court's ruling that this type of expression was close to pure speech, which has
repeatedly been held to be protected by First Amendment).
87 See Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25-26 (1989) (explaining that "freedom of
speech" means more than simply the right to talk and write, but holding, in this case, that
the "kernel" of expression was not sufficient to bring activity within the protection of First
Amendment); see also Amy Mitchell Wilson, Public School Dress Codes: The
Constitutional Debate, 1998 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 147, 151-152 (1998) (exploring contexts in
which expression may be protected).
88 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (acknowledging "that conduct may
be sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments") (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974));
2006] FJBSTAMENDMENT INANAGE OF TERRORISM 545
inquiry utilized to determine whether a particular form of
conduct contains sufficient communicative elements is whether
there was an intent to convey a particularized message and
whether there was a likelihood that the message would be
understood by its viewers.8 9 Expression of offensive or repugnant
ideas and conduct are also safeguarded, in the same manner as
generally accepted or popularly held views. 90 As is the case with
most fundamental liberties, this First Amendment right to free
expression contains its limitations, and not all conduct intended
to express an idea is protected speech. 91 United States v.
O'Brien92 termed the long accepted rule that "when 'speech' and
'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct,
a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms."9 3
The Free Speech Clause of the United States Constitution's
First Amendment has consequently expanded to include
expressive and symbolic conduct, but is not and never has been
an absolute principle. Certain circumstances, such as the 'true
see also Bradford, supra note 26, at 612 (noting Court's decision to hold flag burning as
symbolic speech protected by First Amendment). See generally Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984) (providing rule that "[slymbolic
expression of this kind may be forbidden or regulated if the conduct itself may
constitutionally be regulated, if the regulation is narrowly drawn to further a substantial
governmental interest, and if the interest is unrelated to the suppression of free speech")
(citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
89 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (setting out test to determine involvement of First
Amendment rights); see Bradford, supra note 26, at 612 (reviewing Court's decision in
Johnson that if conduct intending to convey particular message was likely to convey that
message, it would be considered speech falling within scope of First Amendment).
90 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414 (stating "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein") (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943)); see Rosenfeld, supra note 47, at 1529-30 (discussing importance and
value of First Amendment right to free speech and expression to American citizens,
especially when speaking against government or popular belief).
91 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 (holding destruction of registration certificate is not
necessarily constitutionally protected activity and stating that "[w]e cannot accept the
view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the
person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea"); see also Zick, supra
note 80, at 2277 (noting that O'Brien defined burning of draft card as gesture which
resided at outer reaches of First Amendment).
92 391 U.S. 376 (1968).
93 Id. at 376; see Zick, supra note 80, at 2277 (explaining that Court found
government's interest in conducting draft was unrelated to suppression of expression and
outweighed individual's interest in symbolic expression).
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threats' exception as discussed below, warrant limitation to the
freedom of speech.
III. TRUE THREATS
The 'true threats' doctrine, utilized and applied in Virginia v.
Black94 can be characterized as one of the justifiable limitations
on Americans' free speech rights.95 The Supreme Court first
acknowledged this true threats exception to the First
Amendment in Watts v. United States,96 ruling that a state is
permitted to ban certain types of threatening speech. 97 A 'true
threat' is defined as a statement where the speaker
communicates a serious expression of his or her intent to commit
a violent, unlawful act against a particular person or group of
persons. 98 Thus, the speech is unprotected if an objectively
reasonable person would interpret the speech as a serious
expression of an intent to cause a present or future harm.99 The
three Watts factors used to guide a court's decision on whether
the contested speech falls within the true threats exception are
the context in which the statement was made, the statement
itself, and the reaction of listeners.100 The validity of a true
threat is judged by the objective reaction of the individual
94 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
95 Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60 (defining true threats doctrine and describing it as
exception to First Amendment guarantees); see Elrod, supra note 2, at 547 (stating
Supreme Court has declared in several cases that true threats remain beyond circle of
First Amendment protected speech).
96 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
97 Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (permitting First Amendment to ban true threats, but not
political hyperbole); see Elrod, supra note 2, at 558-59 (noting Supreme Court does not
consider political exaggerations or statements made in jest "true threats"); see also
Martin, supra note 1, at 283 (noting Supreme Court conceived true threats doctrine in
Watts).
98 Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (ruling that '[t]rue threats' encompass those statements
where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an
act or unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals"); see Elrod,
supra note 2, at 547 (recapping Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Black defining true
threats). But see Martin, supra note 1, at 290 (claiming that Court in Black did not
distinguish true threats from protected speech).
99 See Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616 (5th Cir. 2004)(reaffirming Black's true threats rule); see also Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist.,
306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding free speech protections do not extend to modes
of expression such as obscenity, defamation and fighting words).
100 Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (discussing how speech in this case was not true threat);
see Elrod, supra note 2, at 559 (setting forth some factors which Court used to determine
if Robert Watts' words rose to the level of true threats); see also Martin, supra note 1, at
284 (listing three factors which dominated Watts decision).
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listener and not from the subjective mindset of the speaker.101
Consequently, the speaker does not need to actually intend to
carry out the specific act which he or she threatens. 102 Rather,
the purpose of the true threats doctrine is to protect the
individual listener or group of listeners from the fear of violence,
and also to protect these individuals from the possibility that the
threatened violence will occur. 103 Additionally, mere advocacy of
the use of force or violence is outside the realm of the true threat
exception. 104
One type of true threat, as discussed in Black,105 is
intimidation, where a speaker directs his or her threat to a
person or persons with the intent of placing that victim in fear of
bodily harm or death.106 Virginia v. Black ruled cross burning as
constitutionally proscribable conduct because it intimidated a
targeted group of victims, causing them to fear imminent danger
or physical harm. 107
101 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) (discussing requirement of listener's
reaction in determining true threat) (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388
(1992)); see Martin, supra note 1, at 290 (stating Court's rule that true threats encompass
statements where speaker purposefully communicates intent to commit violence).
102 Black, 538 U.S. at 360 (explaining that for true threat exception to apply, intent of
speaker is not necessary); see Martin, supra note 1, at 290 (justifying rationale behind
allowing states to proscribe true threats); see also Frederick Schauer, Intentions,
Conventions, and the First Amendment: The Case of Cross-Burning, 2003 Sup. CT. REV.
197, 216-17 (2003) (questioning intent's role in First Amendment analysis of true threat
cases).
103 Black, 538 U.S. at 360 (discussing how prohibition on true threats protects people
from the fear of violence and from the possibility threatened violence will occur); R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (ruling Federal Government can criminalize
threats to protect people "from the fear of violence, from the disruption that the fear
engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur").
104 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (reiterating that "the mere
abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force
and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to
such action") (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)); see Brannon,
supra note 17, at 330 (promoting need to distinguish moral propriety of use of violent
force from act of preparing and building courage of group to take such violent action).
105 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
106 Black, 538 U.S. at 360 (defining intimidation, a subset of true threat); see
Brannon, supra note 17, at 336 (discussing Black's determination that intimidation can be
prohibited); Schauer, supra note 102, at 203 (discussing intimidation's role in Justice
O'Connor's Black decision).
107 Black, 538 U.S. at 360 (proving cross burning as within definition of intimidation);
see Brannon, supra note 17, at 337 (noting Court's conclusion that Virginia statute fell
within intimidation exception and therefore banning cross burning with intent to
intimidate did not violate First Amendment); see also Schauer, supra note 102, at 203
(discussing Black's conclusion that it was permissible for Virginia to ban cross-burning
due to its intimidating nature, a quality which First Amendment does not protect).
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The rationale used by judges and legal scholars in support of
the true threats doctrine includes the detrimental effects such
threats have on society and targeted individuals, coupled with
the lack of discursive value provided by such intimidations. 108 In
other words, the harms clearly and fully outweigh the benefits, if
any benefits in fact exist. 109 The true threats' negative impacts
consist of: the fear and apprehension the threat causes to the
listener, the disruption provoked by said fear, and the costs of
preventing, reducing or protecting against the threatened
violence.110 Among such costs to the individual are the monies
spent by the targeted individuals for safety measures, such as
locked gates and security systems, and lost income due to
reduced productivity caused by the distraction or fear for one's
self or loved ones and psychological counseling."'1 Society also
bears a costly burden in paying additional taxes on the federal,
state and local level for such services as properly educating and
training law enforcement officers and funding agencies for
investigatory and precautionary purposes.112  All these
detrimental costs and impacts on the individual and society must
then be weighed against the alleged benefits of according true
threats First Amendment immunity. It is argued, however, that
there are no positives in allowing such threats within the
definition of free speech, because they obliterate all discussion,
debate and divergent views, thereby eliminating all of the
108 See Black, 538 U.S. at 360 (holding that prohibition on true threats serves to both
protect individuals from fear of violence and from the disruption such fear engenders); see
also Elrod, supra note 2, at 547, 550 (discussing negative impacts of true threats and little
value of threats to cause bodily harm).
109 See Elrod, supra note 2, at 550 (quoting Professor Kent Greenawalt stating that
"[s]ociety has a strong interest in providing people with a sense of security that their most
basic rights will not be trampled upon" and that "[t]he threat that makes one feel
vulnerable to just such a violation may properly be seen as an ancillary right to be secure
in one's rights"); see also Black, 538 U.S. at 360 (citing rationale for true threats doctrine
as harm that threats of violence are apt to cause, both on a personal level and on a more
general level in terms of undermining the safety that citizens feel as members of society).
110 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) (listing both fear and disruption
fear engenders as rationale for true threats doctrine); see also Elrod, supra note 2, at 547-
48 (listing detrimental impacts on threatened individual).
111 See Elrod, supra note 2, at 548-49 (describing specific costs on individuals or
groups of individuals whom are threatened); see also Alexander Tsesis, Hate Speech and
Hate Crime: Regulating Intimidating Speech, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 389, 389 (2004)
(discussing impact of hate speech in terms of undermining sense of safety in society).
112 See Elrod, supra note 2, at 549 (determining societal costs due to such threats);
Tsesis, supra note 111, at 389 (concluding that hate speech "intentionally used to
intimidate others can drastically undermine public safety and social welfare").
548
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functions of the First Amendment.113 Therefore, there ought not
to be a First Amendment concern in regulating true threats; in
fact, it seems antithetical to the right to free speech's purposes of
exchange of ideas, robust debate or discussions of political or
social importance to allow for such true threats to go
unpunished.114
By utilizing and applying this analysis, a cross-burning that is
carried out with the intent to intimidate, like that in Virginia v.
Black,115 constitutes a true threat, and therefore creates an
exception to the First Amendment right to free speech and
expression. 116 A burning cross placed on an individual's property
conveys a threat of future physical harm or violence, and subjects
that victim to fear and intimidation.117 Specifically in Black,
victim James Jubilee testified that after seeing the cross on his
front lawn, he was very nervous about what would happen next
to himself and his family.118 Generally, all cross-burnings with
the intent to intimidate are true threats because they
communicate the speaker's or actor's intent to threaten or
commit a violent act against the person, family, or group of
people to whom the burning cross is directed.119 For centuries,
113 See Elrod, supra note 2, at 552 (stating that true threats discourage debate by
instilling fear and apprehension rather than encourage debate by stimulating the
intellect); Tsesis, supra note 111, at 404 (summarizing Justice O'Connor's findings in
Black that cross burning was of such slight social value that any benefit that may be
derived from it is clearly outweighed by social interest); see also Demaske, supra note 47,
at 289 (questioning necessity and logic of using First Amendment to protect speech that
has no social value and that is socially and psychologically damaging to minority groups).
114 See Black, 538 U.S. at 360. Justice O'Connor argues that prohibitions on "true
threats" serve not only to protect individuals from threatened violence, but also from the
disruption of their lives that stems from such fear. Id. The fear of speaking freely is a
likely component of such disruption. Id. True threats also fail to further the purposes of
free speech by silencing opposing viewpoints. Elrod, supra note 2, at 551-52.
115 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
116 See Enslin, supra note 10, at 202 (applying definition that cross-burning that is
carried out with the intent of intimidating any person or group constitutes true threat);
see also Tsesis, supra note 111, at 402 (proffering interesting argument that Thirteenth
Amendment prevents any hate speech which is rationally related to the badges or
incidents of servitude).
117 See Enslin, supra note 10, at 195-98 (discussing California and Florida's rulings
on such facts); see also Rosenfeld, supra note 47, at 1540 (explaining that "cross burning
produced fears not only concerning the past but also the present and the future, and not
based on events that had taken place across an ocean, but on events that had marked the
sad history of race relations in the United States from the founding of the republic").
118 Black, 538 U.S. at 350 (summarizing facts of case and reaction of victims); see
Enslin, supra note 10, at 203 (noting that Black provides additional evidence of
threatening nature of cross-burning).
119 See Black, 538 U.S. at 363. Justice O'Connor clearly states that banning cross-
burning with the intent to intimidate is consistent with the First Amendment. Id. Such a
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cross burning has been associated with the Ku Klux Klan and its
ideology of hatred and terrorism. 120 The Klan used the burning of
a cross as a tool of intimidation and a threat of impending
violence, which was buttressed by the organization's actual
participation in hundreds of murders, floggings, bombings,
beatings, shootings, stabbings, mutilations, assaults and tar-and-
featherings.121 As Virginia v. Black122 itself stated, "These cross
burnings embodied threats to people whom the Klan deemed
antithetical to its goals. And these threats had special force
given the long history of Klan violence."123 Still today, cross
burnings convey this threat of violence towards the targeted
victim, intended to instill a message of fear, and are therefore
fully within the true threats exception to the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment. 124
This same analysis of the true threats doctrine applies to
terrorist threats and intimidating speech; a point into which this
Note will further delve and support in Section V of this text.
conclusion requires that these acts constitute true threats. See id. Additionally, cross-
burning with the intent to intimidate fits the definitions of 'true threats' that have been
offered by various courts, including the Black dissent. Enslin, supra note 10, at 202-03.
120 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 352-54 (2003) (explaining history of Ku Klux
Klan and its use of cross burning and specifying that "[flrom the inception of the... Klan,
cross burnings have been used to communicate both threats of violence and messages of
shared ideology"); see Rosenfeld, supra note 47, at 1540 (noting that cross burning
produces fears based on past events of racial violence).
121 Black, 538 U.S. at 548-49 (condemning Ku Klux Klan's participation in threats,
intimidation and actual violence); Id. at 388-89 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that
the Ku Klux Klan is "[t]he world's oldest, most persistent terrorist organization," that it
was actively harassing, torturing and murdering in the United States "[f]ifty years before
the Irish Republican Army was organized [and] a century before Al Fatah declared its
holy war on Israel," and that "its members remain fanatically committed to a course of
violent opposition to a social progress and racial equality in the United States"); see Eric
John Nies, The Fiery Cross: Virginia v. Black, History and the First Amendment, 50 S.D.
L. REV. 182, 198-99 (2004) ('The Klan has not stopped at mere intimidation; a burning
cross often has been followed by violent Klan activity, including assault and even
murder.").
122 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
123 Id. at 355.
124 See Black, 538 U.S. at 357 (stating that "[t]he person who burns a cross directed
at a particular person often is making a serious threat, meant to coerce the victim to
comply with the Klan's wishes unless the victim is willing to risk the wrath of the
Klan... [a]nd when a cross burning is used to intimidate, few if any messages are more
powerful"); Rosenfeld, supra note 47, at 1540 (describing fears produced by cross-burning
due to past events and history of race relations).
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IV. SYMBOLIC SPEECH AND THE MEANING AND IMPORTANCE OF
SYMBOLS
As established in Section II of this Note, the United States
Supreme Court includes symbolic expression and communicative
conduct within the parameters of the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment, affording such speech the same Constitutional
safeguards.125 Symbols such as cross burning or terrorist fear
tactics are therefore subject to First Amendment jurisprudence
and limitations, including the true threats rule.126 If spoken
words have meaning, symbols speak legions, and should be
regulated with increased proportion, especially when their
threatening nature is heightened.127
Certain actions carry messages, or express the actor's
viewpoint on an issue he or she regards as important.128 The
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment applies its
protections, rules and exceptions to weak or forceful messages
alike whether expressed in words, symbols, or symbolic
actions.129 Symbolic speech is the combination of speech and non-
speech elements which together create expressive conduct.130 For
125 See supra Part II (outlining evolution of free speech jurisprudence); see also
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) (noting that
the Supreme Court has repeatedly held symbolic gestures "closely akin to 'pure speech"'
are entitled to comprehensive First Amendment protection).
126 See supra Part III (describing true threats doctrine); see also Black, 538 U.S. at
359 (2003) (discussing various forms of speech that are subject to restrictions, including
true threats).
127 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003). Individuals choose symbolic
displays like cross burning rather than other forms of communication because they convey
a message in such a dramatic way. Sean M. SeLegue, Comment, Campus Anti-Slur
Regulations: Speakers, Victims, and the First Amendment, 79 CAL. L. REV. 919, 925
(1991). "Like the KKK calling card, epithets draw part of their strength from the ability to
threaten impending violence." Id.
128 See MARK SABLEMAN, MORE SPEECH, NOT LESS 35 (Southern Illinois University
Press) (1997) (describing conduct carrying message as symbolic speech); Joshua
Waldman, Symbolic Speech and Social Meaning, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1844, 1844 (1997)
(The doctrine of symbolic speech holds that some conduct, for example flag burning, may
be sufficiently communicative to warrant First Amendment protection.").
129 See Sableman, supra note 128, at 35 (arguing that First Amendment protections
must apply to symbolic expression in same way as verbal and written speech); Edward J.
Eberle, Cross Burning, Hate Speech, and Free Speech in America, 36 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 953,
964 (2004) (noting dichotomy between expressive conduct, which is protected, and
proscribable conduct, which is not).
130 See Sweeney, supra note 74, at 83 (defining symbolic speech); see also Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (exploring which forms of expressive conduct surpass
thresholds of speech protected by First Amendment).
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symbolic speech to fall within First Amendment parameters, it
must have a communicative impact and contain clear elements of
communication rooted in the conduct.131 If a symbol has
numerous potential meanings, the examining court - in order to
choose the most likely meaning - must examine the symbol itself,
the use of the symbol by the specific individual actor and the use
of the symbol in that particular context. 132
Symbols have special importance in American politics and
jurisprudence, urging courts to fully discern their meaning before
too hastily concluding an issue regarding its First Amendment
protections.133 The meaning or truth that Americans attach to
certain symbols is more telling than what the symbol originally
represented or claimed to signify.134 Symbols such as the flag, the
Great Seal and the slogan e pluribus unum, for example, have
both a historical role in politics and an effect in influencing and
self-identifying Americans as constituents in society. 135 Political
131 See Sweeney, supra note 74, at 83 (describing what symbolic speech must consist
of, and explaining that Supreme Court delineated guidelines so that not all conduct is
claimed as First Amendment protected speech); see also United States v. O'Brien 391 U.S.
367, 376-78 (1968) (upholding government restrictions on symbolic speech if "it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest").
132 See Zick, supra note 80, at 2348 (emphasizing that court will look to "the gesture
itself, its history, its appearance in literary references and film, government attempts to
regulate it, and finally, a broader cultural picture into which the gesture 'fits"' when
examining symbolic behavior); see also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 354-57 (2003)
(explaining evolving use of Ku Klux Klan's symbolic use of burning crosses).
133 See WILLMOORE KENDALL & GEORGE W. CAREY, THE BASIC SYMBOLS OF THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 18 (The Catholic University of America Press) (1995)
(highlighting symbols' role in American politics and culture); see also The Supreme Court,
2002 Term: Leading Cases I. Constitutional Law: E. Freedom of Speech and Expression,
117 HARv. L. REV. 339, 341-42 (2003) (explicating Black Court's careful consideration of
symbolic meaning attached to cross burning before rushing to conclusions). See generally
Zick, supra note 80, at 2272, 2347 (explaining that despite important cultural meaning of
symbols, Supreme Court has often treated symbolic meaning with indifference or has
avoided interpretation of symbolic meaning altogether, but adding that Virginia v. Black
shows positive change in Supreme Court's approach because the Court consulted
historical, anecdotal, institutional, and other sources in building contexts for its ultimate
interpretation of cross-burning symbols).
134 See KENDALL & CAREY, supra note 133, at 22 (discussing people's own
understanding of symbols and importance of this to society); ERIC VOEGELIN, THE NEW
SCIENCE OF POLITICS 53 (The University of Chicago Press) (1952) (stating that "[t]he
symbols in which a society interprets the meaning of its existence are meant to be true; if
the theorist arrives at a different interpretation, he arrives at a different truth concerning
the meaning of human existence in society").
135 See KENDALL & CAREY, supra note 133, at 18 (listing examples of important
symbols in American history and political culture); see also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.
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philosopher Eric Voegelin illustrates, "The self-illumination of
society through symbols is an integral part of social reality, and
one may say even its essential part; for through such
symbolization the members of society experience it as more than
an accident or a convenience; they experience as part of their
human essence." 136 Culture is entrenched in symbolism.137 In
fact, culture itself is a system of symbols, with the mastery of
symbolic meaning representing the self-actualization to personal
development and cultural robustness.138 The Voegelin view of
symbolism teaches that every human society has an
understanding of itself through various symbols.139 Voegelin also
points out that symbols do not have a stagnant meaning in
society; rather, as time passes, these symbols develop, enrich or
impoverish in meaning and importance, or fade, allowing new
symbols to replace them.140 Interestingly enough, this theory
views the basic symbols within Western civilization as variants
of the original symbolization from the Judaeo-Christian religious
tradition. 141
Because many symbols have such a rich and full meaning
behind them, a symbol of hatred or violence means much more
than simple verbal expression and thus is likely to invoke
343, 388 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that "[i]n every culture, certain things
acquire meaning well beyond what outsiders can comprehend").
136 See VOEGELIN, supra note 134, at 27.
137 See Zick, supra note 80, at 2272 (discussing First Amendment and culture of
symbolic gestures); see also Rosenfeld, supra note 47, at 1529-30 (reviewing historic cases
regarding limits of hateful symbols within free speech).
138 See Zick, supra note 80, at 2272 (stating that "[i]nterpretive ethnographers
recognize that cultures are laden with symbolism"); see also Rosenfeld, supra note 47, at
1529-30 (noting free speech afforded by First Amendment is itself a symbol of American
culture).
139 See KENDALL & CAREY, supra note 133, at 23 (discussing Voegelin's philosophy
regarding meaning of symbols in society); VOEGELIN, supra note 134, at 27 (professing
that human society is reflected in various symbols showing "condition of their self-
realization").
140 See KENDALL & CAREY, supra note 133, at 24 (discussing Voegelin's view of
changing meaning of symbols); VOEGELIN, supra note 134, at 28-29 (stating that "[in the
course of this process some of the symbols that occur in reality will be dropped because
they cannot be put to any use in the economy of science, while new symbols will be
developed in theory for the critically adequate description of symbols that are part of
reality").
141 See KENDALL & CAREY, supra note 133, at 24 (noting basic symbolizations in
Western civilization are variants of Judeo-Christian religious traditions); Robert L. Tsai,
Sacred Visions of Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1095, 1102-03 (2005) (explaining that notions of
"constitutional iconography" embed Judeo-Christian traditions and symbols in American
legal culture).
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extreme, disturbing emotion and fearful responses. 142 Most
symbols are used for their communicative impact. Therefore,
symbols - like a burning cross, swastika or pictures of an
airplane flying into a burning skyscraper - speak volumes to the
targeted individual.143  Hate groups will utilize symbols
connected with past destructive episodes to incite violence and
hatred in the present.144
As the famous adage teaches, "a page of history is worth a
volume of logic."145 The symbolic meaning of a burning cross and
the hatred and violence it conveys is no exception to this rule.146
Virginia v. Black147 faced this issue by studying and reviewing
historical, anecdotal, and institutional sources in creating the
context to interpret the true meaning of this symbol.148 As the
court in Black149 declared:
[T]he burning of a cross is a symbolic expression. The reason
why the Klan burns a cross at its rallies, or individuals place
a burning cross on someone else's lawn, is that the burning
cross represents the message that the speaker wishes to
communicate. Individuals burn crosses as opposed to other
means of communication because cross burning carries a
message in an effective and dramatic manner.150
142 See Zick, supra note 80, at 2289 (discussing that symbols are often intended to
evoke ranges of emotional response); see also Eberle, supra note 129, at 953-54
(discussing how symbols including burning crosses are indicative of hate or degradation).
143 See Zick, supra note 80, at 2289 (listing different symbols that spark intense
emotion within certain cultures and why they are of interest to particular groups); see
also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (disagreeing that Ku Klux Klan's use of a cross was politically symbolic
rather than religious because of historical perspective).
144 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 352 (2003) (noting that, for the Klan, cross
burnings are tools of intimidation and threats of impending violence, but also remain
potent symbols of shared group identity and ideology); see also Tsesis, supra note 111, at
389-90 (discussing Justice O'Connor's decision in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)).
145 Black, 538 U.S. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 421 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)) (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256
U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
146 Black, 538 U.S. at 363 (holding states can outlaw cross burning by taking history
of Ku Klux Klan into consideration); Zick, supra note 80, at 2264 (discussing ideology and
operations of Ku Klux Klan).
147 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
148 Black, 538 U.S. 343, 352-57 (discussing historical context of cross burnings); see
Zick, supra note 80, at 2347 (noting that "[t]he Court consulted historical, anecdotal,
institutional and other sources in building context for its ultimate interpretation").
149 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
150 Id. at 360.
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This specific type of communication has been linked with the
hatred and violence of the Ku Klux Klan throughout American
history.151 When a cross is burned, it symbolizes the Klan's
celebration of former slaves' execution, the extreme racism its
members have against Black Americans in response to civil
rights movements, the bombing of churches, the murders of
blacks as well as whites whom the Klan viewed as sympathetic
towards the Civil Rights Movement, and intimidation.152 In
short, "ritual cross burning has been a cultural symbol of hatred,
racial animus, and violence."153 Black also points out that the
burning cross also symbolizes shared identity and ideology, as
the Ku Klux Klan often used the symbol for its own purpose of
celebration and ceremony at meetings and rallies. 154 "According
to the Klan constitution (called the kloran), the 'fiery cross' was
the emblem of that sincere, unselfish devotedness of all
klansmen to the sacred purpose and principles we have
espoused."155 This Note argues that said symbolism of shared
ideology only adds to the cross's meaning of intimidation, racism
and hatred, because these are the ideological rules of which the
organization espouses.156 The Black Court seemed to agree,
concluding that the Ku Klux Klan's core cross burnings have
predominantly embodied threats to those targeted, and therefore
holding that states may ban cross burnings as symbolic acts
intended to threaten. 157
151 See Black, 538 U.S. at 352 (observing that "[b]urning a cross in the United States
is inextricably intertwined with the history of the Ku Klux Klan"); see also Zick, supra
note 80, at 2349 (noting that "[t]he Court made a strong case that throughout American
history and experience, the burning of the cross has been linked with the Klan"). See
generally Tsesis, supra note 111, at 390 (arguing that cross burning refers to this
country's history of involuntary servitude).
152 See Black, 538 U.S. at 353-57 (detailing various groups that Ku Klux Klan has
attacked); Zick, supra note 80, at 2344-47 (explaining what burning cross meant to
members of Ku Klux Klan).
153 Zick, supra note 80, at 2345.
154 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 356 (2003) (noting that "cross burning became
climax of rally or initiation"); Zick, supra note 80, at 2346 (describing how cross burning
became symbol of Ku Klux Klan and central feature of its gatherings).
155 Black, 538 U.S. at 356.
156 See Black, 538 U.S. at 357 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that "to this day,
regardless of whether the message is a political one or whether the message is also meant
to intimidate, the burning of a cross is a 'symbol of hate"'); Zick, supra note 80, at 2344-47
(detailing message sent through burning of a cross).
157 Black, 538 U.S. at 355 (describing local ordeals and protections set up in various
states); see Zick, supra note 80, at 2347 (describing Supreme Court's rationale for holding
cross burnings as threatening symbols).
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In the same way the Ku Klux Klan's burning cross emanates
messages of violence and hatred, there can be a deep meaning
behind terrorists' symbolic speech, an issue into which the next
and final section of this Note delves.
V. EFFECT OF VIRGINIA V. BLACK ON TERRORIST GROUPS AND THE
HATE SPEECH THEY PROMOTE AND SYMBOLISM THEY USE
Intense meaning emanates from the fearful symbols and
threatening behavior which terrorist groups utilize. Such
expressive and communicative conduct can be characterized as
symbolic speech, therefore being subject to the jurisprudence,
protections and limitations of the First Amendment's Free
Speech Clause, including the true threats doctrine.158 It
consequently follows that if such symbol or mode of
communication made by the terrorist organization or individual
expresses an intent to commit a violent and unlawful act against
a particular person or persons, thereby satisfying the
requirements of the true threats doctrine, it can be
constitutionally regulated and limited. Examples of such
proscribable speech might include: a threat of white powder
resembling anthrax mailed to a person, a large, vivid poster used
at a celebratory or planning rally with the morbid images of the
Twin Towers on September 11, 2001, an Internet website
targeted towards intimidating specific individuals,159 a weapon
recipes book, or other types of verbal, written, expressive or
symbolic threats directed towards an individual or group of
individuals.
This Note will use the State Department definition of
terrorism, which is "premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups
158 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (introducing true threats
doctrine); see also United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 52 (1994) (affirming conviction for
threatening mailings).
159 See Peter Margulies, The Clear and Present Internet: Terrorism, Cyberspace, and
the First Amendment, 2004 UCLA J.L. Tech 4 (2004) (arguing that threats on Internet
intimidate others because of internet users' resources to carry out threat and to reach
specific individuals); see also Prana A. Topper, Note, The Threatening Internet: Planned
Parenthood v. ACLA and a Content-Based Approach to Internet Threats, 33 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 189, 211 (2001) (exploring Internet true threats and consequences).
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or clandestine agents."16o The State Department, moreover,
defines terrorist activity as:
Any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place
where it is committed (or which, if it had been committed in
the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the
United States or any State) and which involves any of the
following: (I) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance
(including an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle); (II) The seizing or
detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to
detain, another individual in order to compel a third person
(including a governmental organization) to do or abstain
from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the
release of the individual seized or detained; (III) A violent
attack upon an internationally protected person (as defined
in Section 1116(b)(4) of Title 18) or upon the liberty of such a
person; (IV) An assassination; (V) The use of any - (a)
biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or
device, or (b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or
dangerous device (other than for mere personal monetary
gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the
safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial
damage to property; (VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to
do any of the foregoing.161
For purposes of this Note, the threats of terrorists to partake in
these illegal and violent activities will be juxtaposed with such
organizations' claimed right to free speech under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
As discussed above, in addition to representing hatred and
violence, symbols can define a culture at a specific time in
history. 162 For example, following and in response to the terrorist
attack of September 11, 2001, patriotic expression, through the
use of symbols, was prevalent throughout all parts of the United
States of America.163 Americans more frequently than ever
160 22 U.S.C. § 2656f (d)(2) (2005).
161 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(3)(B)(iii) (2005).
162 See KENDALL & CAREY, supra note 133, at 22 (discussing importance of symbols to
defining society's role in history); see also VOEGELIN, supra note 134, at 53 (stating
symbols define meaning of "human existence in society"). See generally Zick, supra note
80, at 2272 (discussing First Amendment and culture of symbolic gestures).
163 See Howard M. Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, 12 WM. & MARY BILL OF
RTS. J. 367, 367-68 (2004) (discussing patriotic expression within United States following
tragedy of September 11, 2001); see also Blaine Harden, Flag Fever: the Paradox of
Patriotism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at 1 (describing widespread display of American flag
during month following events of September 11, 2001).
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attached flags from houses and cars, placed supportive sayings
and ribbons on their bumpers and windows, played the Star-
Spangled Banner, recited the Pledge of Allegiance, renamed the
popular food to "Freedom Fries" in symbolic criticism of the
French government, and sung God Bless America at their
sporting events and public gatherings.164 Perhaps the most
descriptive symbol of American culture and society representing
our survival and recovery from the deadly September 1 1 th attacks
is the enduring image of the New York City firefighters hoisting
the American flag on a steel beam amongst the wreckage of the
World Trade Center buildings. 165
This patriotic sentiment, as a response to the horrible attack
on the United States home front, and as evidenced by these types
of symbolic expressions, has extended into the public's view of the
First Amendment. After September 1 1 th, a large plurality of
Americans immediately supported limitations on the right to free
speech due to national security interests. 166 The willingness of
the American populace to sacrifice a certain amount of civil
liberties is not unusual during a time of war or national
emergency;1 67 nor is the courts' response to such times in their
interpretation of constitutionally challenged wartime statutes. 168
164 See Wasserman, supra note 163, at 368 (noting such patriotic symbolic speech was
prevalent throughout the country); see also Jack Curry, Flags, Songs and Tears, and
Heightened Security, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001, at 15 (describing Major League
Baseball's use of patriotic symbols during first games after events of September 11, 2001).
165 See Robert S. Chang, (Racial) Profiles in Courage, or Can We Be Heroes Too?, 66
ALB. L. REV. 349, 365 (2003) (noting image of firefighters raising flag at World Trade
Center was "symbol of American courage in the face of darkness"); see also Wasserman,
supra note 163, at 368 (remembering important image of America's immediate survival
and recovery from the September 11th attacks).
166 See Meaghan E. Ferrell, Balancing the First Amendment and National Security:
Can Immigration Hearings be Closed to Protect the Nation's Interest, 52 CATH. U.L. REV.
981, 981-82 (2003) (observing that "a New York Times poll conducted just before the first
anniversary of the attacks revealed that forty-nine percent of Americans felt that the
First Amendment's protections went too far in the context of the war on terrorism"); Paul
Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and Institutions in the First
Amendment, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 3 (2003) (noting that a poll taken in the fall of 2001
found that a slim majority of American public favored government censorship of news it
believed was a threat to national security").
167 See Anthony Lewis, Civil Liberties in a Time of Terror, 2003 WIs. L. REV. 257, 264
(2003) (discussing instances in history where civil liberties have been limited when
country was in time of war or national emergency); Liezl Irene Pangilinan, "When a
Nation is at War:" A Context-Dependent Theory of Free Speech for the Regulation of
Weapon Recipes, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 683, 717 (2004) (observing that after
September 11, 2001 attacks, the public, Congress and courts were fully supportive of
President George W. Bush limiting certain civil rights).
168 See Horwitz, supra note 166, at 27 (pointing to United States v. Schenck, 249 U.S.
47 (1919) and other United States Supreme Court cases that upheld laws which limited
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The Supreme Court has held that free speech is not absolute, and
must be instead balanced against valid governmental interests,
such as national security and safety during a war.169
It is this Note's position that if terrorist groups invoke true
threats through their use of symbols, intimidation or promotion
of certain hate speech, their actions should be proscribable under
the First Amendment and therefore fully regulatable by the state
or federal government, in the same way as is a burning cross.
With their history of hatred and violence carried out against
those they hate, groups supporting or linked to organizations
such as Al-Qaeda and Hamas are comparable to the Ku Klux
Klan of our generation, and their actions should thus be
regulated under the true threats exception. Just as the cross-
burning American terrorist organization intimidated and
threatened through its history of hundreds of murders, beatings
and bombings, when A1-Qaeda threatens a specific American or
group of Americans, it symbolizes and reminds the listener of its
successful murderous plot against thousands of American
workers. Hamas similarly instills the fear of all its car and
suicide bombings when it threatens Israelis or possibly even
Israeli-Americans. These symbolic threats send a powerful
message about the target's vulnerability, given the terrorist
organization's context of carrying out violence. Additionally, as
established in the 'True Threats' section of this Note, such speech
is exceedingly harmful with practically no positive social value or
contribution towards the search for truth in the marketplace of
ideas, buttressing the argument that it should therefore not be
protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
A proscribable 'true threat' by such a terrorist organization
would be defined by the courts in the same manner as used and
civil liberties during wartime or national emergency); Pangilinan, supra note 167, at 718
(noting differing standards in Supreme Court cases between wartime and peacetime
issues).
169 See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) (holding that
"[a]t the outset we reject the view that freedom of speech and association... as protected
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are 'absolutes'...." (citation omitted)); see also
Paul Rosenzweig, Civil Liberty and the Response to Terrorism, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 663, 663
(2004) (summarizing that "[iun any civilized society the most important task is achieving a
proper balance between freedom and order" and that "[in wartime, reason and history
both suggest that this balance shifts in favor of order - in favor of the government's
ability to deal with conditions that threaten the national well-being").
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applied to the cross-burning case in Black. 170 As opposed to mere
advocacy of the position against so-called American Imperialism
or in favor of Islamic fundamentalism or Palestinian freedom, if
one of the mentioned groups or a member of a similar
organization communicated a serious expression of his or her
intent to commit a violent or unlawful act against a particular
person or group of persons, such communicative conduct ought to
be limited under the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. 171
Thus, the Black jurisprudence and the true threats doctrine
permits the government to regulate, limit or criminalize a
terrorist's direct threats to a person or persons with the intent of
putting them in fear of bodily harm or death.172
A sprinkling of federal court cases have been decided regarding
such threats of terror, finding various examples not protected by
the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. First, the Fourth
Circuit in Rice v. Paladin & Murder Manuals173 held dangerous
"weapon recipe" instruction manuals as unprotected speech
under the First Amendment.174 Moreover, there are currently
five statutory mechanisms which impose criminal liability for the
dissemination of such weapon recipes.175 In United States v. Al-
Arian,176 defendants did not plan the attacks of the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad Shiqaqi Faction (PIJ), but they did support the
attacks and "promoted [the PIJ's] activities and organization,
170 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (defining "true threat" as "those
statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to
commit and act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals");
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (noting "political hyperbole is not a true
threat").
171 See Black, 538 U.S. at 352 (noting that States have authority to ban "true threats"
(citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)); see also Elrod, supra note 2, at
547 (stating that Supreme Court declared in several cases that "true threats" lie outside
limits of First Amendment protected speech).
172 See Black, 538 U.S. at 360 (noting that "speaker need not actually intend to carry
out the threat"); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (declaring that the First
Amendment "protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear
engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur").
173 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
174 See Paladin, 128 F.3d at 250 (holding that the First Amendment does not bar
plaintiffs action against publisher of book which contained instructions on how to be a
"hit man"); Pangilinan, supra note 167, at 700-01 (discussing court's reasoning in
Paladin).
175 See Pangilinan, supra note 167, at 701-02 (listing five federal statutory provisions
which punish such activity); see also 18 U.S.C § 842(p) (2003). See generally United States
Department of Justice, Report on the Availability of Bombmaking Information (April
1997), http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/bombmakinginfo.html.
176 280 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
20061 FIRSTAMENDMENTNANAGE OF TERRORISM 561
raised monies to fund its terror operations, and gave succor to
the families of bombers in order to encourage a policy designed to
entice new human weapons." 177 Given the violent nature of the
organization,178 as well as the risks the individual defendants
posed, the court granted the government's motion to detain the
two defendants.179 National security concerns trumped all other
individual interests when the government proved defendants
were ranking members in the organization who played an active
role in its violent goals and participated in terrorist events in the
Middle East. 180
Seemingly following the rationale of this Note, United States v.
Zavre1181 affirmed defendant's conviction for violating a federal
statute by mailing seventeen envelopes with a white powdery
substance intended to resemble anthrax to various local officials,
including President George W. Bush.182 The Third Circuit ruled
such expressive conduct as communication, as well as a true
threat, because a reasonable person opening an envelope
containing a white powdery substance during the anthrax scare
of 2001 would fear immediate and future injury.18 3
177 Al-Arian, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1350-51.
178 Al-Arian, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1348. The Court explains:
The PIJ considers itself 'the vanguard of the Islamic Revolutionary Movement.' Its
creed is blunt, violent, and uncompromising. The PIJ rejects any peaceful solution to
the Palestinian question. It advocates the destruction of Israel, the elimination of
Western influence, particularly from the United States, in the region, and the
creation of an Islamist state. And it aims to achieve all this through terror - the
senseless, brutal murder of innocents in public places designed to instill fear,
instability and panic in the populace and the government of Israel. The PIJ killed
over a hundred in Israel and the occupied territories during the period referenced in
the indictment. It maimed many more. The roll call of dead and wounded included
Americans.
Id. Unlike other extremist groups, the "PIJ's sole tactic is violence." Tamara Lytle,
Violence Seen as a 'Natural Right, Palestinian Islamic Jihad Succeeds in Creating
Martyrdom and Mayhem, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 16, 2003, at G1.
179 Al-Arian, 280 F. Supp.2d at 1346, 1358-59 (stating and explaining court's
holding); see Elaine Silvestrini, Al-Arian Associate Plea Bargains In Another Case, TAMPA
TRIB., Feb. 15, 2005, at 4 (stating that A1-Arian and Hammoudeh are still being detained).
180 See Al-Arian, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1347-49 (explaining extreme threat defendants
pose due to their intrinsic roles in terrorist group); see also Rosenzweig, supra note 169, at
689-90 (asserting that balance between civil liberty and national security has shifted
since Sept. 11, 2001 and, as such, no one argued in Al-Arian that wiretapping alleged
terrorist was unlawful or unwarranted).
181 384 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2004).
182 Zavrel, 384 F.3d at 137 (affirming judgment of district court).
183 Id. (concluding that mailing cornstarch in wake of 2001 anthrax scare constitutes
communication and that Zavrel's mailings constituted threats to injure recipient).
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In United States v. Sattar,184 defendants were charged with
helping an influential and high ranking co-conspirator
communicate with terrorist organizations outside of prison, as
well as conspiring to defraud the United States, conspiring to
murder and kidnap persons in a foreign country, soliciting
persons to engage in crimes of violence and providing and
concealing material support for the aforementioned
conspiracy. 185 Although defendants claimed that the statute they
were charged under was unconstitutional, the district court held
that the First Amendment provided no protection for the conduct
of providing resources knowing and intending that they are to be
used for crimes of violence, nor with conspiring to murder and
communicate with terrorist organizations outside of prison. Such
expressive conduct was indeed constitutionally proscribable.186
In contrast, a local anecdotal example of questionable
threatening behavior occurred just weeks after September 11,
2001, when William Harvey handed out leaflets near Ground
Zero with a picture of Osama bin Laden superimposed over the
burning Twin Towers and praised bin Laden and the attacks.18 7
The District Attorney then brought charges to prosecute and the
trial judge denied defendant's motion to dismiss based on First
Amendment grounds.1SS The trial judge further ruled, "[it] is the
reaction which the speech engenders, not the content of the
speech that is the heart of disorderly conduct" and that Harvey
should have expected a violent reaction, given his timing of the
speech.' 8 9 The state later dropped the charges, so the probable
result is not known, but this example illustrates the views of the
184 314 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
185 Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d 279 (outlining various charges and counts against
defendants).
186 Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d 279 (rejecting defendants' argument that certain charges
against them were unconstitutionally vague).
187 See Wasserman, supra note 163, at 406 (describing course of events); see also Joe
Bob Briggs, Joe Bob's America: Silencing Osama Lovers, UNITED PRESS INT'L, MAR. 18,
2002 (illustrating how Harvey demonstrated his political message).
188 See Wasserman, supra note 163, at 407 (discussing procedural posture of case); see
also No Charges Against Bin Laden Supporter, 227 N.Y. L.J. 6, 6 (April 26, 2002) (stating
that after J. Ross' declined to dismiss charges against Harvey, District Attorney
Morgenthau dropped case).
189 Wasserman, supra note 163, at 407 (noting '[it] is the reaction which speech
engenders, not the content of the speech, that is the heart of disorderly conduct' and that
Harvey should have expected a violent reaction, given the timing of his speech" (internal
citations omitted)); see also Tom Perrotta, Man Faces Trial For Public Stir Over Bin
Laden, 227 N.Y. L.J. 1, 1 (Feb. 1, 2002) (recapping Judge Ross's quote).
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public as well as the courts in limiting speech regarding threats
and terrorism.190 Such expressive conduct probably lies on the
outer limits of the true threats conduct and would likely not rise
to the level of intimidating unprotected speech.191
As illustrated above, the current case law regarding the topic
of whether terrorist organizations have an unlimited right to
threatening speech and expressive conduct is novel and rather
sparse. The few cases decided on the issue, however, seem to
apply Black's true threat exception when the actions rise to the
level of instilling directed fear and intimidation, and agree that
in those cases the speech or expressive conduct ought be limited.
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that Americans' First Amendment right to
free speech is fundamental and cherished within our United
States Constitution, and furthermore that unpopular ideas
should not be censored within the 'marketplace of ideas.' There
are, however, certain areas of speech which have always been
limited, and for rational and justifiable reasons. The true threats
exception ensures that individuals are not placed in direct fear
for their life or physical being and allows governments to punish
such activity without working contrary to the Free Speech
Clause. Just as the symbolic speech of burning a cross in
Virginia v. Black was held to be proscribable as a true threat, so
too ought similar threats from terrorist organizations. This Note
proposes that certain intimidating communicative conduct should
be considered within the true threats exception and therefore be
limited by the United States and local state governments.
190 See Wasserman, supra note 163, at 407 (noting that state later dropped charges
against Harvey because it was unlikely that any conviction would withstand First
Amendment scrutiny on review); see also No Charges, supra note 188, at 6 (stating that
District Attorney dropped Harvey's case).
191 See Wasserman, supra note 163, at 407 (noting that charges against Harvey
would not withstand First Amendment scrutiny); see also Barber v. Dearborn Public
Schools, 286 F. Supp 847, 849, 857 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (holding student's shirt with
photograph of President Bush containing phrase "International Terrorist" constituted
type of symbolic act protected by the First Amendment and did not cause substantial
disruption of school activities).

